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TWO LIVES OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES V.

ROBERTSON'S *Charles V.* appeared in the year 1769 and has since gone through some three dozen editions. The author was paid 4,500 pounds, the largest sum ever received for a work on history up to that time. His praises were loudly sung by many of the greatest men, and even Gibbon expressed himself as proud to be mentioned in the same breath. But perhaps the strongest proof of the estimation in which Robertson has been held is the fact that from that early day until 1902 there was no attempt in the English language to write a history of the period on a similar scale. The man who ruled over more territory than any other king or emperor since Roman times, the man whose reign saw the rise of the Protestant faith, was left without a modern biographer; and generation after generation of English readers was obliged to content itself with that which Robertson had offered.

The appearance, then, of a most careful and thoughtful work¹ by a thoroughly equipped Oxford scholar is a great event for the student of history. Not only is our actual knowledge greatly increased, but we are furnished with a point of vantage from which to look back and see what progress has been made in this field during the past century and a quarter. But first a word must be said about the relative scope of the two works, and it must be noted at the outset that Robertson's introductory "View of the State of Europe," which is the most scholarly part of his work, has no counterpart in Armstrong; that the latter treats of certain topics relating to the New World which Robertson reserves for a separate volume; and that, finally, Armstrong ends his work with 1555, the year of Charles's abdication, while Robertson continues to the Emperor's death in 1558. This latter circumstance is the more curious as Robertson professes to be writing a history of the *reign* and Armstrong of the *life*—distinctions, indeed, which are not logically adhered to by either writer. One last, important difference is, that Armstrong's work is more of a study, Robertson's more of a narrative; the one looks at a question from all sides, the other seems chiefly bent on the artistic representation of a scene or an

¹ *The Emperor Charles V.*, by Edward Armstrong, M.A. (2 vols., Macmillan, 1902).

episode. Here we have, it seems to me, one of the chief contrasts between the old and the new history writing. The present tendency is towards a descriptive and interrogatory style, whereas formerly we had story pure and simple.

One of Robertson's cardinal faults, which does not seem to have troubled his contemporaries, is a one-sidedness and partiality so serious that it is doubtful if a modern critic would have found a word of praise for the book. This is no history of the reign of Charles V.; it is a history of the Reformation, enlivened by details of Charles's campaigns. Martin Luther, not Charles, is the hero; it is Luther's youth and development that are followed at the greatest length; it is of Luther's character that we learn the most details; it is the difficulties that beset Luther and the Protestant princes, not those that beset Charles, that really interest Robertson. Charles, against whom Robertson seems throughout to feel the greatest personal animosity, has been chosen as the merest foil. His reign is a convenient background for church history, that is all; and in his enthusiasm Robertson goes back to the Waldensians, to Wycliffe and Huss, to the Great Schism and the councils of Constance and Basel, to the wicked popes and ecclesiastics of the end of the fifteenth century. We have disquisitions on clerical courts and on clerical immunities, on the manner of taxing the clergy, on the conferring and the reserving of church lands. Robertson credits himself, indeed, with having "avoided entering into any discussion of the theological doctrines of popery," but we are forced to the conclusion that the reader's escape has been but narrow. In secular affairs, except perhaps for Spain, we have no analogous treatment—no characterization of persons, no genesis of institutions. The Empire is a vague generalization; Charles is always "Emperor of Germany." In the "introductory view" there is, indeed, a superficial account of the German diets, which represents those assemblies as "originally . . . exactly the same with the assemblies of March and May, held by the *Kings of France*," and a still more superficial account of the electoral college, in which no mention is made of so important a document as the Golden Bull of Charles IV. Of the early history of the Netherlands and their connection with the Empire, of the so-called Burgundian Circle, of the treaty of 1547 between the Empire and the Netherlands that fixed the relations of those two powers, there is never a word.

Another fault that a modern critic would never pardon is the incomplete use even of the authorities that were easily obtainable at the time. Robertson on one occasion says frankly, "As the several books which contain the information necessary towards dis-

cussing this point with accuracy, are written in the German language, which I do not understand, I can not pretend to enquire into this matter with the same precision wherewith I have endeavored to settle some other controverted facts which have occurred in the course of this history." He might have said the same for the Dutch language and possibly also for Spanish. One can readily estimate the value, from a modern point of view, of a history of a Catholic ruler over Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain, compiled almost exclusively from French, Italian, and Latin Protestant sources! Just so, for matters pertaining to the rivalry of Francis and Charles, Robertson frequently relies on the sole authority of de Bellay, a Frenchman and a general of Francis. For the war with the princes of the League of Schmalkald he takes page after page from Sleidan, the official Protestant chronicler of the league. It is true his authorities are all "original sources," a fact which must have greatly imposed on his contemporaries. But an "original source," if inspired by religious or national prejudice, is the worst possible guide. Even a good source is often best studied through the medium of a competent commentator who will point out the best text, the best interpretation, and the particular application; yet this kind of a guide Robertson seems consistently to have scorned.

In comparison with Robertson, Armstrong's array of authorities is most imposing. After citing in five lines the works that go to form the earlier writer's chief stock in trade, he mentions some thirty great collections of state papers, letters, and diplomatic reports, of acts of diets, and of military and other memoirs; while the preliminary list of modern authorities fills four pages, and throughout the book are scattered numerous references to valuable monographs on special points. Neither Armstrong nor Robertson has used manuscript material, and neither, unfortunately, has made critical remarks, or has given his reasons for accepting or rejecting any particular statement.

If we cease generalizing and turn to individual topics, we shall learn to distinguish with more precision between the achievements of the earlier and those of the later historian. Almost at the outset we are met by an instance of Armstrong's determination to avoid anything like the narrative style or the sonorously rounded periods of his famous predecessor. Be it said in parenthesis that his style is even too careless and colloquial, as when he speaks of Charles as the "travelling director of the Hapsburg syndicate" or says in the language of foot-ball that in war "tries" count not for, but against the side that makes them. To the whole dramatic episode of the contest for the imperial crown Armstrong devotes

little over a page, on the plea that Charles had contributed almost nothing to his own election, and that he, the biographer, means to concern himself only with what personally affected his hero. But surely in this Armstrong has gone too far. Even according to his own reasoning, he should have mentioned the *Wahlcapitulation*, or bill of rights which the electors wrested from the successful candidate; for in this document Charles made agreements which more than once hampered him in the course of his reign. For instance, the leniency shown to Luther in according him a hearing before the Diet of Worms seems to have borne direct relation to the promise to place no one under the ban of the Empire without formal proceedings. For Robertson the famous diet itself is merely an arena in which Luther is to display his bravery; and all the constitutional matters, some of them of great importance, are disposed of in a paltry ten or twelve lines. Armstrong, on the contrary, devotes many pages to showing how during these months while the diet was in session all the great problems of the reign were being formulated — constitutional reform; the attitude to be observed towards the knights and the peasants; the relations with the French, the papacy, the Turks, the Castilian communes, the New World. We learn the political tendencies that were working in Luther's favor, and just why his teachings were likely to become popular with the princes as they already were with the lower classes. We are brought to see plainly why it was that Charles could not possibly consent to the Pope's demand for the immediate condemnation of Luther; how the hearing before the diet marks an important epoch in the life of Charles fully as much as it does a supreme moment in Luther's career; how the young Emperor stifled public discussion by his bold personal intervention; and how bravely, finally, he stood up for his own rights on the whole question of constitutional reform. He could not prevent the establishment of a governing council, but he prevented the serious curtailment of the imperial prerogatives, and so weakened the original proposition that the council, in point of fact, never came into active rivalry with him.

When we come to the happenings in Germany between the Edict of Worms in 1521 and the religious truce of Nuremberg in 1532, we find ourselves in a world almost unknown to Robertson. There is no mention of the Knights' War, nor do the names of Hutten and Sickingen so much as occur in his pages. The governing council is not referred to again. There is no real explanation of the various economic and other causes that drove the peasants to their great revolt. In treating of that struggle itself the misrepresentations are almost ludicrous. The princes, "unwilling to shed the blood of

their deluded subjects, sent a young nobleman to their camp, with the offer of a general pardon, if they would immediately lay down their arms," which unwillingness to shed blood was certainly not apparent later. What the princes really did was to lure the poor peasants on with false negotiations until they themselves could raise and equip their armies. It is Sleidan who leads Robertson to say that "during these commotions Luther acted with exemplary prudence and moderation; like a common parent, solicitous about the welfare of both parties, without sparing the faults or errors of either." No word about the terrible writing "against the murderous and rapacious hordes of the peasants," who are called "brands of hell" and "limbs of Satan," and are consigned to the merciless princes to be "struck down, throttled, and stabbed in secret or in public." There is not much "exemplary moderation" about phrases such as these. Armstrong is entirely in accordance with the evidence when he declares that the reformer "had thrown himself with unseemly violence on the side of authority, and had hounded on the nobles to the extirpation of the wretches who had misunderstood his far from obvious meaning." Naturally Robertson knows nothing of the great cleft that Luther's attitude brought about between himself and the common people, of the change in the reformer's views as to a priesthood emanating from the masses, of his turning and placing his hopes on the territorial princes. All this is admirably brought out by Armstrong: "Luther, shrewd and versatile as he was passionate and stubborn, saw his opportunity and threw his whole energy into the service of the princes. If his doctrines were to survive, they must be associated not with the declining but with the rising element, the territorial state. He had once for all had his fight; he was by nature too conservative, and also too sensible, to be logical or consistent. He had done with the priesthood of the individual, the absolute liberty of conscience, the entire freedom of religion from the state, the election of the ministry by the congregation. Obedience to authority was now to him the first and great commandment. . . . Luther was twitted, not without some reason, with having become a Pope."

In the chapters devoted to the revolt of the communes of Spain, to the wars against Francis I. in Italy, and to the expedition against the Barbary corsairs, we find the old difference of treatment: Robertson narrates, Armstrong investigates and explains. The latter is always in search of motives, causes, and characteristic features; the former's one endeavor seems to be to spin out dramatic episodes to the utmost possible length. It is a pleasure to follow Armstrong as he unfolds the national, religious, social, and economic elements

that caused the Spanish troubles. He makes clear to us what was the actual area of the revolt and compares the disturbances in one section with those in another. With regard to the famous rivalry between Charles and Francis, he shows that it had its origin, long before the imperial election, in a series of bitter humiliations inflicted by Spain upon France. He leads us through the tangled maze of Italian politics with a sure hand, showing the motives and aims of all the powers, large and small. On the question of Charles's responsibility for the sack of Rome he dwells at some length, showing that the Emperor was so far away that it required three months for his communications to reach the army, and that none of his commands or instructions contemplated anything more than an armed demonstration under the walls of Rome. In connection with the African expedition we are told just what comprised the African possessions of Spain, and why their retention was such a vital question.

The diet of Augsburg of 1530 gives Robertson a new opportunity of commiserating these Protestant princes, who are always being intrigued against and wronged. They seem to him so good, so single-minded, so obedient! "At the Emperor's desire, all the Protestant princes forbade the divines who accompanied them to preach in public during their residence at Augsburg"; their zeal "was then of such strength as to overcome attachment to their political interests." As a matter of fact the princes flatly refused to silence their preachers, or even to have them avoid contentious topics, until Charles asserted his right, as head of an imperial town, to decide what form of religion should be tolerated in his presence. Nor does Robertson mention the bitter enmities at this diet between the Protestants themselves—Melanchthon's avoidance of Bucer, Philip of Hesse's refusal to hear the sermons of Agricola. There is no word about the *Tetrapolitana*, or separate confession of faith handed in by the four Zwinglian cities of south Germany. Indeed, all through these volumes Zwingli is only once mentioned, and then as an ally of Luther. Of such a scandal as the bigamous marriage of Philip there is not so much as a hint. Yet that scandal to-day is considered a most striking symptom, if not the actual cause, of the decline of the Protestant party. Not merely were Luther and Melanchthon severely discredited by their acquiescence in the marriage and by their official countenancing of lying and deceit, but Philip, overwhelmed by the reproaches and scorn of his own friends, went over to the enemy and became the Emperor's ally, receiving a promise of indemnity for the past and protection for the future. It is true he reserved the right of returning to his colleagues should

they be directly attacked, but he did harm enough to his cause by engaging to oppose the admission of England, France, and Guelders into the Schmalkald League. He was a traitor to his cause, for his dealings with Charles were kept a secret.

But it is time for us to turn from a discussion of special episodes to what is, all in all, the most interesting question : how does the Charles of Robertson's pages compare with the man described by Armstrong? Since the Scotch divine wrote his work a great deal of new evidence has come to light, and of the most direct and conclusive kind. We have whole correspondences of the Emperor himself with different members of his family, public and private documents emanating from ministers and from foreign ambassadors, instructions for the guidance of Charles's son. It is important to note, therefore, how far the conventional picture has had to be redrawn. It is true Robertson disclaims any intention of dwelling on the personal, private virtues of the Emperor, reserving his forces for great European movements ; but as a matter of fact he is never chary of giving his opinion, and the fact that the disclaimer comes at the end of the book and is joined to a complaint of the difficulty of finding material on the subject robs it of much of its force.

It must be said at once that the Charles of Robertson is one of the most shadowy and unreal persons that ever looked forth from the printed page of a history. He is an imaginary type, not a man who once lived and breathed. He is the conventional ogre of the childish fairy tale, the very Antichrist of the pious Protestant. His "insidious and fraudulent policy" is contrasted with the "open and undesigning characters" even of a Francis I. and a Henry VIII. Throughout one whole portion of the book his name is rarely mentioned without the accompanying epithet "the artful," or other words to convey the same idea. He is always engaging in "intrigues" or concocting "schemes." His own distinguishing characteristic is an "insatiable ambition," an ambition "so rapacious as to be restrained by no consideration either of decency or of justice." He acts "with the mercenary heart of a corsair" ; "his ambitious views enlarged in proportion to the increase of his power and grandeur." We hear much of the Emperor's "arrogance." He is "so intoxicated with a single victory as to imagine that he might give law to mankind." "He aimed at rendering the imperial crown hereditary in his family and would, of course, establish in the Empire an absolute dominion." He "gave law to the Germans like a conquered people." We hear of him "boasting of his own power and exploits with insolence." There are a few scanty words of praise for endurance and bravery in the African expedition ; and in the

summing up on the occasion of Charles's death there are tributes to one or two other virtues. Everywhere else the cloven foot is brought into prominence. There are reiterated charges of hypocrisy : " notwithstanding the specious veil of religion with which he usually endeavored to cover his actions, Charles, in many instances, appears to have been but little under the influence of religious considerations." When we come to the arrest and imprisonment of the Protestant leaders, Philip of Hesse and John Frederick of Saxony, Robertson's powers of denunciation reach their culmination. In not keeping the bond which the Elector of Brandenburg and Maurice of Saxony had given to Philip, Charles " abrogated at pleasure the most sacred laws of honor and most formal obligations of public faith." " The state of subjection to which the Empire was reduced appeared to be more rigorous as well as intolerable than that of the most wretched and enslaved nations, if the emperor, by an arbitrary decree, might cancel those solemn contracts which are the foundation of that mutual confidence whereby men are held together in social union."

If now we take up the allegations of Robertson and examine them in the light of the very thorough investigations made by Armstrong (who, however, never himself criticizes his predecessor), we shall find Charles turning from a shadow into a thing of flesh and blood. At times he is very human indeed, and far more genial than we are accustomed to imagine him. When entering Siena in 1536, he " was radiant with smiles ; he would rein in his horse and joke now with one citizen and now another." " Spying a little Piccolomini, a very pretty child, carried in a servant's arms, he called him up, looked earnestly on the child's face and kissed him." At Aigues Mortes in 1539 he visited his rival Francis I., and the two dined together : " At the dance which followed they would stand, now arm in arm, now hand in hand, bandying jokes with this lady and with that : never had Charles been seen to laugh so heartily." At Innsbruck he once " made as though he would kiss the younger ladies, but disengaged himself as soon as might be from those of riper years " (the words are those of an old chronicle). Armstrong's picture of Charles is all the more trustworthy because he is never his unconditional advocate. The Emperor's slowness, his irresolution, his occasional obstinacy, his lack of original conception are nowhere concealed, and once his policy is declared inexcusable. What Armstrong invariably does, however, and what Robertson as invariably omits, is to show the other side of the case—the tremendous provocation, the patient endurance up to that time, the impossibility, occasionally, of taking any other course. It was, indeed,

an overwhelming task for one man to look after so many realms, confront so many different enemies both at home and abroad, solve so many religious, political, social, commercial, and colonial problems.

Robertson's charge of artfulness is too vague to concern us for more than a moment. From our wider point of view it is difficult to understand why the epithet could not just as well be applied to every great ruler who has had to deal with several enemies at the same time. Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Bismarck were all infinitely more artful than Charles. Charlemagne, perhaps, was not; he had no coalitions to fear, and simply struck down opposition wherever he found it. That Charles V., like any modern diplomatist, refused to carry his plans upon his sleeve; that he often temporized with one set of enemies while sore beset by another; that he concealed his joy at the occasional straits of the Pope and the French king, though outwardly preserving a semblance of decent regret—all this does not constitute an artfulness that must stigmatize his life. As well affix the epithet "the perjured" to every mention of the name of Francis I. Surely Charles never committed an act that even distantly approached in perfidy the French King's premeditated breach of the treaty of Madrid! As a matter of fact, Robertson is so permeated with the idea of Charles's vast, illimitable ambitious designs that he looks upon him as passing his life in trying to conceal them. Never once does he grasp the Emperor's real aims, never once does he appreciate the constant striving for national as well as religious unity, or that composure under adverse circumstances which Melancthon himself termed "marvellous and glorious."

Armstrong disposes of the charge of overweening ambition, indirectly but conclusively, by showing that the Emperor had a great respect for law and for parliamentary institutions, and that he frequently bowed to adverse judgments; that his aims were actually too conservative for his own good or for the good of Germany: "Throughout this diet [the 'armored diet' of 1548], held at the moment when Charles was at the summit of his power, there is no trace of the autocratic spirit of the *hoc volo sic jubeo*. For each of his proposals he had patiently courted the support of public opinion; he had wished the national representatives to take the initiative. Whenever he was assured that popular feeling was against him, he bowed to it, and withdrew or modified his most cherished schemes. . . . From first to last his attitude was defensive, forced upon him by the movements of his enemies. . . . He never clutched at what was not his own." We have at this juncture Charles's most private instructions for his son Philip — instructions which amount to a polit-

ical will and testament — and they breathe the very spirit of conservatism. Philip is to avoid provocation and only to fight under compulsion. He is to maintain the *status quo* wherever possible, to lighten the burdens of his people, and to rule them with justice. Over against the accusation that Charles aimed at absolute dominion Armstrong places the facts that diets in Germany were called so frequently as to displease even the Protestant princes, and that the Estates General of the Netherlands met more than fifty times during this reign. All that Charles asked for after his great victory at Mühlberg was a closer confederation of all Germany on the model of the Suabian League, and even this proposition he let fall under the opposing fire. This was the one moment when, had he wished it, he might possibly have become absolute; yet he repudiated all advice to that end, and continued, as Armstrong puts it, “to listen as usual to the clamors of the more pushing Protestants and the shrieks of disappointed Catholics.”

Of all the charges brought by Robertson none seems more unfounded than that of hypocrisy. It would be hard to prove a single case where Charles “endeavored to cover his actions with the specious veil of religion.” Although more tolerant than the Pope and the Catholic princes, and far more so than the Protestant princes or than their more modern advocate, he was continuously and consistently loyal to the faith that he professed. He lived for it; he fought for it; and rather than be untrue to it and make a disadvantageous peace with the heretic, he abdicated his throne and gave himself wholly to the observances which that faith prescribed. It is true that once, under excessive provocation from the Pope, he declared that Luther after all might prove a useful man; it is true, too, that he once accepted money from the Moors as a condition of procuring the modification of an edict of the Inquisition; but those are isolated matters not fully understood, and by no means prove that he was a hypocrite. His desire to see the truth prevail seems to have been thoroughly sincere, and in the matter of disputed points of doctrine he always sought the aid of his theologians. He wished peace with the Protestants on the basis of mutual comprehension, to which end he instituted numerous conferences. The Confutation of the Augsburg Confession was returned to its authors no less than five times, to see if its tone might not be softened; and as a last hope, the Emperor even appointed a committee of seven Catholics and seven Protestants to discuss disputed points. Armstrong thinks that Charles in the end had absolutely no option but to accept the Confutation. Had he been ever so yielding to the Lutherans, yet “had his sentence differed a hair’s breadth from the

opinions which Luther at that crisis held, it is unquestionable that no Lutheran, except perhaps Melanchthon, would have accepted it. . . . Luther, directing or abusing the Lutheran disputants from his retreat at Coburg, was less the hero of the hour than Charles, who day by day bore the turmoil and the tedium, flouted by Protestants, thwarted by Catholics, yet never losing his composure, never forsaking his conciliatory attitude."

According to Robertson, Charles in 1546 went to war against the Protestant princes solely on account of their religion, though professing other objects; treated the conquered leaders with great cruelty and injustice; and, finally, in the most arbitrary manner imposed the "interim," or temporary norm of faith, on Germany. That a religious element entered into the war is not to be denied; indeed Charles was obliged to emphasize that element, probably more than he wished, in order to consummate the much-needed alliance with the Pope. But he was not hypocritical in contending that he was aiming at the suppression of disobedience rather than of dissent. Armstrong points out that several Protestant princes fought on Charles's side and that those who remained neutral were not molested. In the terms of peace with the towns, religion plays a very small part, and no extra hardship was inflicted on John Frederick for refusing to submit to the decrees of Trent. It was the Protestants themselves who sought to give the war an exclusively religious form: "in a papal country," John Frederick told the burgomaster of Aschaffenburg, "there is nothing neutral." On the whole, Armstrong makes it clear that the war was bound to come, even had Luther never been born and the Reformation never taken place; and he reaches the conclusion that the princes frustrated union with Charles rather from political than from religious motives. What they really feared was imperial consolidation, and to prevent that they were willing to call in the French, the Turks, the English, or even the German papists. Charles had avoided war for thirty years, but it could be avoided no longer if he was to remain master in Germany. The main institutions of the Empire had too often been set at naught; its territory had been seized by individual princes who neither asked for nor received imperial investiture. The Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse had declared their contempt for diets; there had flowed a steady stream of seditious pamphlets; Luther himself had declared that the Emperor was no true emperor, but a tyrant and a devil.

Charles's treatment of the Elector and the Landgrave was not generous, but Armstrong shows that it was not altogether unjust. The list of grievances against the house of Wettin was long and

black. Frederick the Wise had defied the Edict of Worms by hiding Luther in the Wartburg ; his successor had drawn up the "Protest" and helped to form the League of Schmalkald. John Frederick himself had aided the rebellious Duke of Cleves and had raised revolt against Ferdinand in Bohemia. The Landgrave of Hesse had intrigued with every one of the Emperor's enemies. Philip's friends maintained that Charles had played the Landgrave horribly false in not keeping the promises made and briefed by the Elector of Brandenburg and Maurice of Saxony. As it happens, a draft of the original agreement exists, and it shows the hollowness of this contention. Philip, indeed, seems really to have been deceived ; but the fault rests with the intermediaries, not with Charles. Maurice was warned at the time that he was pledging too much.

Not the least of Charles's alleged crimes was the attempted enforcement of the "interim," which was dubbed at the time a "strait-jacket for Protestantism." Yet even for this Charles is not wholly responsible. Even after his decisive victory he did everything to associate others with him in dealing with the old, unsolvable problem, and again appointed a mixed committee. But, to quote Armstrong, "neither party would stir a finger to promote the peace for which both clamored, nor was either prepared for mutual toleration." And here comes the strangest rectification of Robertson, who intimates that the interim was thrust upon the Protestants by the Archbishop of Mainz's suddenly rising and constituting himself the mouthpiece of the whole diet assembled. As no one had courage or presence of mind to oppose, the whole measure was considered passed without debate. In point of fact the Lutherans, treated with separately, had accepted the interim without much demur ; "the Catholics, however, who regarded themselves as victors, although they had contributed nothing to the victory, offered violent opposition." It was as *their* mouthpiece when they did finally acquiesce, that the Archbishop of Mainz, whose "presumption" Robertson considers so "unprecedented and unconstitutional," rose up to express assent. But on the matter of making the interim equally applicable to both parties, the Catholics were inflexible, and that was what made the measure so odious to the Protestants. It became a compulsory, invidious decree, which was far from what Charles had intended ; as such it was laughed to scorn and became a dead letter.

In the space at command it has been manifestly impossible to do justice to the more positive excellencies of Armstrong's book. I am inclined to think it one of the calmest, most dispassionate, most

scholarly works on modern continental history ever written by an English pen. It gives an entirely new picture of Charles, a picture that appeals to the sympathies and that strikes one as true. In his final summing up Armstrong designates the Emperor as, "all deductions made, an honorable Christian gentleman, striving, in spite of physical defects, moral temptations, and political impossibilities, to do his duty in that state of life to which an unkind providence had called him. It was not his fault if—to alter a single word of Morosyne's conclusion—'all was a good deal better meant than he could do it.'"

ERNEST F. HENDERSON.